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Abstract 
Transport investments are often regarded by governments as essential to economic growth. Within this framework, private 
sector participation is integral to achieve government objectives. However, we observe that private investors exhibit a 
cautious attitude towards this class of investments. This work examines the financial and regulatory drawbacks that hinder 
private transport investments. We argue that availability and the structure of transport financial mechanisms should take 
account of, and be adaptable to, the needs of private investors.  Regulatory conditions are therefore advocated as key levers 
for governments in enabling investment and attracting private sector participation.   
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1. Introduction 
 
 In the context of the present economic downturn not only is it essential to examine infrastructure investment 
as a major contributor to a higher economic growth rate (Balesh, 2012), but it is also important to study how 
these investments can be organized and supported by financial mechanisms. The total amount of infrastructure†  
investment required to sustain economic growth in OECD countries, given the temporal horizon of 2030, is 
estimated to be above $50 trillion (Crocer, 2011), and although the majority of these future investments are 
expected to be financed by the private sector, the level of private transport investment is still insufficient (CBI, 
2012). 
 
 
* Corresponding author.  Tel.:+440780582853. 
E-mail address: f.medda@ucl.ac.uk 
† By infrastructure investment we refer to investment in three main categories of existing types of infrastructure: transportation, utilities and 
social infrastructure. Transportation refers to bridges, toll roads, airports, seaports, tunnels, etc. Utilities include electricity, energy, gas, water, 
and waste. The third category (social infrastructure) encompasses schools, hospitals, prisons, etc. (Beeferman, 2008).  
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 Private investment in transport has always been part of the financial framework, but in recent years new 
developments to promote private transport financing have begun to flourish in the market. An investment vehicle 
known as Infrastructure Funds, first set up in the mid-1990s in Australia, gained acceptance in Europe and North 
America during the early 2000s in response to the need for an alternative asset class after the financial crisis of 
the early 2000s, and due to the availability of cheap debt (Inderst, 2009). Infrastructure began to emerge as a new 
asset class that could offer stable returns and better diversification benefits because of its specific investment 
characteristics.  
 
 The World Bank (2011) has claimed that ‘investing in infrastructure is the best bet to spur growth and jobs’. 
The latest development of structured finance and the wide number of financial instruments available in the 
market gives governments several financial tools which can be tailored and fine-tuned to achieve effective 
results. However, the private sector does not actively seek to invest in infrastructure. Our objective in this paper 
is to examine the underlying reasons for the cautious participation of the private sector and its tentative attitude 
toward this investment class. We argue that adequate availability, the structure of the financial mechanism, and 
satisfactory regulatory conditions are key prerequisites for enabling investment and attracting private sector 
participation. To this end we build our argument through an analysis of three main questions related to the 
availability, structure and regulations germane to transport investment. We reach several conclusions and policy 
recommendations for each question, the most significant of which is that, in order for transport investment to help 
some European countries grow out of their financial downturn, governments will need to align their objectives 
more closely with those of private investors.  
 
2. Do the existing infrastructure investment funds promote private investment? 
 
 Direct investment in physical assets requires a high level of capital and exposes the investor to various risks. 
One of the most significant risks in direct infrastructure investment is regulatory/political risk (Bitsch et al., 
2010) because investors have limited influence on the outcome of the political process. This idiosyncratic risk is 
important, since the stability of cash flows is only guaranteed if no change occurs in legal and regulatory 
conditions pertaining to a project. To overcome the drawbacks of direct investment, Infrastructure Funds (both 
listed and unlisted) have been designed to give investors the opportunity to indirectly invest in this asset class. 
The fund strategy of the Infrastructure Funds is based on portfolio diversification across a range of geographies 
and sectors, particularly transport, water and waste, energy, and social infrastructure, and by so doing minimizes 
exposure to idiosyncratic risk. Through the development of Infrastructure Funds, transport has thus become an 
increasingly attractive investment to private investors seeking to benefit from the low correlation with traditional 
asset classes, i.e., equity and bond markets, and who are also keen to lower risk by diversifying their portfolios 
(Newell et al., 2011).  
 
 According to data provided by Preqin (Porter & Krouse, 2012), by 2012 $19.6bn had been raised globally by 
Infrastructure Funds; and when we examine profitability, recent examples of fund closures can be highlighted. 
Global Infrastructure Partners has raised $8.25bn for its fund, making it the largest fund to date. The fund expects 
returns of 15% to 20% in the coming years (Hutchings, 2012) with main assets in energy, transport, water and 
waste. The growth and success of Infrastructure Funds reflects the importance of the diversification strategy in 
order to secure private investors (FE Trustnet, 2012). 
 
 Another fund strategy known as fund-of-funds, which aims for further diversification benefits, has been 
developing since 2008. The strategy of fund-of-funds is to invest in a set of infrastructure funds (usually between 
10 and 20) rather than invest directly in transport projects. Once again the main advantage of the fund-of-funds 
strategy is its well-diversified portfolio (geographies, sector and project phases) and thus its ability to generate 
higher returns for the same level of risk borne by investing the same amount into an infrastructure fund (Probitas 
Partners, 2007). The biggest example of an infrastructure fund-of-funds is that of Macquarie Infrastructure, which 
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has a target size of $500m. But despite the assumption that various Infrastructure Funds would increase in 
popularity among private investors, this type of fund currently represents only a small fraction of the overall asset 
class. One noteworthy obstacle to investment in the fund-of-funds is the costly management fees that are charged 
on top of tax. These costs, with their accompanying jurisdictional issues, send a negative signal to private 
investors. From this perspective we can observe that the management structure of the Infrastructure Funds does 
not yet pave the way for private investors to enter into the infrastructure market. 
 
 Another significant barrier for private investors (such as pension funds) is that the estimation of the transport 
investment profiles, i.e., the risk/return ratio, is a cumbersome task because it is contingent on the underlying 
project, industry sector and above all, the stage of development of a project. Ideal investors for Infrastructure 
Funds are usually institutional investors such as pension funds, because transport investments, by being low-risk 
assets, yield stable income flows over the long-term (Martin, 2010). Within this context, brownfield investments 
(secondary infrastructure) are considered to be the safest investment with the lowest risk/return ratio because 
these assets are already in operation, e.g., toll roads (Russ et al., 2010). The cash flows of brownfield assets are 
predictable and stable, so they fit the investment profile of long-term coupon bonds with 15-30 years to maturity.  
In contrast, greenfield investments (primary infrastructure) are regarded as the most risky investments.  
Greenfield investments have not yet been built and therefore do not generate constant current income. In addition 
to operating risks, greenfield investments also carry design and construction risks, so they are assigned the 
highest risk/return ratio (Inderst, 2009).  
 
 At present, the extent to which an Infrastructure Fund is exposed to each risk depends on the structure of the 
fund and how the manager addresses risk; it is important to mention however, that pension fund managers do not 
have all the necessary knowledge to make these calculations, and despite the popularity of Infrastructure Funds, 
there is scant research on the topic. Crocer (2011) argues that valid results that prove the attractiveness of 
transport investment through robust risk/return ratios would be a significant step forward in the promotion of the 
pension fund industry, and would also benefit regulators and rating agencies. Consequently, a wider 
understanding of transport investment mechanisms would encourage pension fund managers to invest in 
greenfield investments and convince banks to lend.  
 
 In Europe there are many Infrastructure Funds dedicated to European transport, for instance, the Macquarie 
European Infrastructure Fund, but funds are insufficient when compared to international levels. In addition to the 
obstacles examined above, one specific roadblock is that the level of European pension fund resources needed for 
infrastructure investment is too low (Peston, 2012). In contrast, in North America and Canada, pension funds 
have significant resources to invest in transport under umbrella organizations, e.g., the Ontario Teachers’ Pension 
Plan (OTPP), the largest investment group in Canada. Also noteworthy is that some European countries do not 
have Sovereign Wealth Funds. As observed by Armitstead (2012), the establishment of a Sovereign Wealth fund 
would provide guarantees for pension funds through a government commitment to transport investment, and in so 
doing reduce idiosyncratic political risk.  We can therefore conclude this section by observing that general and 
country-specific problems still hinder the entrance of the private sector in transport investments. In the next 
section we will discuss in detail the limitations and advantages of the structure of Infrastructure Funds. 
 
3. Is the structure of the funds fit for purpose? 
 
 Different Infrastructure Funds have evolved to satisfy the needs of investors and also match the several 
maturity structures of various investments; however, none of these structures has met the complete criteria for 
pension funds. We can identify three main structures currently in use: Traditional Private equity fund, Hybrid, 
and Open-ended structures.  
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 The Private-equity fund is the most common Infrastructure Fund vehicle. In this fund the manager (General 
Partner) obtains money from investors (Limited Partners) and uses it to buy a stake in a private company with the 
intention to increase the value of the stake and generate high returns. One way to obtain a higher return is to 
leverage these assets. The structure of this type of fund is therefore illiquid with a general duration of 10-12 
years. Such duration is, however, inappropriate for transport investments. The chief executive of the Pension 
Protection Fund in the UK, Alan Rubenstein, observes that ‘money is there, structure isn’t’ (Infrastructure 
Investor, 2012). Rubenstein argues that the use of private equity is unsuitable for transport funding; he criticizes 
the duration of these funds as too short to satisfy the needs of pension funds where the lifetime of their liabilities 
is much longer, but also too short to enable inflation-hedging.  
 
 Furthermore, Infrastructure Funds usually achieve lower returns than private equity and then also have to pay 
fees similar to those paid in private equity situations, which is not at all attractive to investors (Probitas Partners, 
2007). Returns from transport assets are realized over a longer period than in private equity, so investors might be 
persuaded if lower carried interest charges were to be implemented. The high fees and carried interest may be 
beneficial for fund managers, as they lead to a buy-hold-flip structure, but to restate, they do not correspond to 
the needs of pension funds. Another valid criticism is that the amount of leverage of these funds is too high, and 
too much leverage leads to too much risk incurred by the investor. 
 
 In an attempt to address the problem of the short duration of funds, Hybrid structures have been developed to 
‘enable investors to invest across the transport risk/return spectrum by aggregating investment with both shorter 
and longer maturities’ (Probitas Partners, 2009). For example, the “split-finance” model of the Hybrid structures 
splits the funding between two investors: a bank and a pension fund, whereby the bank can fund a construction 
project such as a “greenfield” project and then exit the project after construction is complete. This arrangement 
would meet the Basel III requirement for shorter investments and ensure higher liquidity. In Hybrid structures 
greenfield investments are sold after completion of a project, giving investors a higher return than would be 
received by holding them until maturity. After the project construction phase, long-term investors such as pension 
funds can then enter and invest in the project, thereby avoiding the construction risk and now benefiting from 
stable secure returns. But Hybrid structures do have some limitations. One of the main sticking points is the 
pricing of the position at the time of transfer. Since some investors want to keep their exposure and others want to 
liquidate their positions, Hybrid structures need to develop a standard method to price investor positions at the 
time of transfer (Haward, 2012).   
 
 A third type of Infrastructure Fund, known as an Open-ended or ‘Evergreen’, was developed in response to 
the illiquidity and short duration issues associated with private equity. These are designed as open-ended real 
estate funds and their long duration closely matches the infrastructure characteristic of brownfield investments 
(long-term income streams). The investment profile is attractive to long-term investors who want to match their 
long-term liabilities but who also want the possibility of a liquidity option. Advantages of Open-ended structures 
are their lower management fees, plus they achieve more diversification benefits over the long-term. However, 
the exit option for investors creates pricing issues just like those faced in a Hybrid structure. Another problem 
with Open-ended structures is the calculation of carried interest; they are not publicly traded, so any carried 
interest paid to the manager is calculated on the Net Asset Value (NAV) and this calculation can vary from fund 
to fund (Probitas Partners, 2009; Beeferman, 2008). 
 
 If we look closely at Infrastructure Funds, one can very reasonably argue that their structure is indeed a 
drawback to their success. The structure of Infrastructure Funds should take account of and be adaptable to the 
needs of private investors.  The pricing issues in conjunction with the inappropriate structures, leveraging, and 
fees charged by the fund manager, reveals a misalignment of interests between the Limited and the General 
Partners. The restructuring of these instruments would therefore represent an important step toward encouraging 
pension fund investments. 
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4. Does current regulation encourage or hinder private investment? 
 
 Scholars and practitioners have observed that international regulations following on the heels of the financial 
crisis will block the private sector from closing the funding gap for investment in transport (CBI, 2011). In order 
to respond to the challenges posed by international regulation and to mitigate their negative effects on private 
intervention, governments will need to draw up various initiatives/schemes. The UK government has made 
concerted efforts in the area of transport finance, and we provide some examples of UK initiatives that are 
specifically designed to encourage private sector investment. 
 
 With the introduction of Basel III in 2010, which will be implemented between 2013 and 2019, the Basel 
Committee sought to improve the resilience of the banking sector by strengthening the regulatory requirements 
for capital. According to the Chief Executive of Societe Generale, Frederic Oudea, Basel III will directly affect 
transport projects (Cowell & Laurent, 2012). For instance, under this new regulation, for the same amount of debt 
that banks gave before the economic downturn, banks will now have to allocate 2-3 times more capital. The 
implication here is that banks will need to charge more for their activity, and as a result, long-term debt will be 
more affected than short-term debt (Inspiratia, 2010).  
 
 Given the limits introduced to banks by the Basel III regulation, the burden of financing transport rests largely 
on institutional investors such as pension funds (Cowell & Laurent, 2012). However, the new insurance 
regulation (Solvency II), scheduled to replace Solvency I in January 2014, will also be applicable to pension 
funds (FINCAD Derivatives News, 2012). Solvency II has been designed to reduce the risk of firm bankruptcy in 
the aim to protect policyholders and prevent market disruptions (FSA, 2012). Under the new regulation, pension 
funds are also obliged to meet higher capital requirements. Transport investments will face the same capital 
charges as hedge funds, private equity and other types of equity.  The fact that transport assets face the same 
capital charges as other assets highlights the notion that regulatory authorities as well as rating agencies do not 
yet recognize that lower risk is a characteristic of infrastructure fund investments.  
 
 In July 2011, HM Treasury announced that UK Guarantees of up to £40 billion will be available for transport 
projects, particularly in transport, utilities, energy, and communications sectors. The scheme was set up to ensure 
that projects struggling to find private investment due to current credit conditions can still proceed as planned.  
As illustrated in the UK National Infrastructure Plan 2012, from the 75 enquiries received up to the present day, 
projects with a capital value of £10 billion have been prequalified as eligible for a UK Guarantee. The purpose of 
the UK Guarantees scheme is to make infrastructure projects more attractive to pension funds, and in so doing, 
lessen the negative impacts of Solvency II. However, after the deep losses incurred by the Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) scheme in the UK during the 1990s, HM Treasury is wary about big taxpayer spends. As a 
consequence, the criteria for a Guarantee are very stringent, and it remains to be seen how much infrastructure 
investment is actually unlocked under this initiative (Flanders, 2012). 
 
 Another UK government scheme dedicated to the pension industry is the new Pension Investment Platform 
(PIP), which is under the auspices of the UK pension funds and was created to support pension fund investment 
in transport and also match the interests of pension funds. The development of the PIP is yet another attempt to 
address the inadequate size of the UK pension funds, which is a problem faced in other European countries as 
well. By following the examples set by other countries, where pension funds come together to invest under 
umbrella organizations, as in the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan in Canada, HM Treasury hopes to achieve 
improved organization and increased amounts of resources for UK transport investment. To date, six new pension 
fund schemes have raised £700m of capital (Infrastructure Investor, 2012).  
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 Until recently the exposure of pension fund investments to partnership structures such as real estate, private 
equity and Infrastructure Funds was limited to 15% of their assets. In an attempt to unlock pension investment in 
transport, the UK government raised the limit to 30%. It was estimated that, by raising the level to 30%, £22 
million currently invested in other assets would be freed up for transport projects, specifically roads and rail 
(Graham & Menon, 2012). We have already discussed how concern about construction risk has led transport 
investors to invest only in brownfield investments. According to Graham Robinson, transport specialist at law 
firm Pinsent Masons, the new UK regulation, introduced in the Local Government Pension Scheme in England 
and Wales, to increase the limit of exposure to transport of a pension fund portfolio from 15% to 30% allows 
pension funds to invest more; however it does not address the riskiness of the investment (Graham & Menon, 
2012). Risk in transport investments arises not only from construction risk but also from the amount of leverage 
of these investments. Many Infrastructure Funds now have up to 80% to 90% leverage; thus, in order to address 
the increased leverage of Infrastructure Funds, the UK government could for example, restrict leveraging to 50% 
(Infrastructure Investor, 2012).   
 
 Two other strategies have been introduced by the UK government in the aim to facilitate transport investment.  
First, the Business Finance Partnership (BFP), operated by HM Treasury was established in 2011 to increase 
capital to transport through sources other than bank lending and to help mid-sized and small firms to be less 
reliant on banks. The UK government has set aside £1.2 billion under the BFP scheme for investments that must 
have private sector matching funds. In addition, the UK has developed other non-bank sources of finance, 
including online platforms and leasing. Secondly, in October 2012, the Green Investment Bank (GIB) became 
operational; it is funded with £3 billion and is expected to privately finance mainly waste and energy projects.    
 
 Although it is clear that the new international regulations will hinder private investment, it is undeniable that 
governments can respond with their own instruments to encourage private investment in transport and in so 
doing, overcome the barriers thrown up by banks’ response to Basel III and Solvency II. However, despite the 
introduction of different UK policies and strategies, and the recognition of the value to be gained by investing in 
transport, we suggest that more needs to be done to increase investor confidence in relation to the expected 
returns and to the risks associated with transport investment. Infrastructure investments face significant 
regulatory risks. The development of a Sovereign Fund, which would invest in transport, could provide yet 
another tool for handling political risk and for guaranteeing returns. A Sovereign Fund can act as a permanent 
fund within which pension funds can invest and can thus constitute part of the pension fund portfolio. The 
pooling together of pension fund investments, in addition to a Sovereign Fund, could certainly provide significant 
resources for transport investment in European governments.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 Governments are aware of multiplier effects which justify the high correlation between transport investment 
and GDP growth. However, the drain of public resources due to the recent financial crisis means that the private 
sector must step in financially to support these investments. Investment banks and fund managers are convinced 
that, due to the physical, economic and financial characteristics of transport assets, investing in transport should 
be ideal for institutional investors like pension funds. Nevertheless, we have in this paper discussed why private 
investors still have a tentative and cautious attitude toward transport investment.  In this work we have addressed 
the problem of private investment in transport. By examining the availability and structure of the financial 
instruments currently in the market, as well as the regulatory environment in which they operate, we have been 
able to understand the main obstacles that hinder private investment.  
 
 The extreme difficulty in calculating the performance of transport funds is one obstacle for investors and 
consequently impacts on their choice of investments which, in order to reduce risk, are often directed to 
brownfield projects. A broader and in-depth research agenda to assess the investment characteristics and 
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performance of infrastructure funds would increase confidence in this asset class and encourage more private 
sector investment, particularly in greenfield projects.  Apart from encouraging private investment, more valid and 
robust analyses and results on the performance of transport as an asset class could also facilitate the design of 
new financial tools and flexible regulatory measures.  For instance, we have proposed the “split-finance” model 
as an effective financial tool for stimulating greenfield investment. This bank-to-pension funding model, by 
addressing the need of the investors according to the different phases of a project, not only releases pension funds 
from the burden of construction risks, but also complies with the Basel III regulation that discourages banks from 
long-term lending.  
 
 Furthermore, we have found that the structure of the infrastructure funds is often not fit for purpose. By this 
we mean that high leverage and high fees, together with short duration, shows a clear misalignment of interests 
between investors and fund managers. A logical proposal would be for fund managers, investors and regulators to 
find common ground through interaction and cooperation and seek to restructure the current investment vehicles.      
 
  ‘Economists estimate that for every £1 spent on construction, £3 is generated in economic activity’ (Threlfall, 
2012). If governments truly want to encourage and support economic growth, the road to transport investment 
appears to be a very reasonable one. However, if during this journey governments want to be accompanied by the 
private sector, it will be necessary for them to recognize the immense support to be given by this travel 
companion.    
 
References 
Armitstead, L. (2012). BCC chief John Longworth calls for new sovereign wealth fund. The Telegraph, 8 October. See 
[http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/9592987/BCC-chief-John-Longworth-calls-for-new-sovereign-wealth-fund.html ] 
Balesh, S.J. (2012). How issuance of rupee bonds abroad can boost infrastructure sector funding. The Economic Times, 7 November. See  
[http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-11-07/news/34971198_1_infrastructure-sector-infrastructure-debt-funds-infrastructure-
category ]    
Beeferman, W.L. (2008). Pension Fund Investment in Infrastructure: A resource Paper. Occasional Paper Series, 3, 1-78. 
Bitsch, F., Buchner, A., & Kaserer, C. (2010). Risk, return and cash flow characteristics of infrastructure fund investments. EIB research 
report no. 15,1, 106-136. Luxembourg: European Investment Bank Papers 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI). (2011). An offer they shouldn’t refuse. Attracting investment to UK infrastructure. London: 
Confederation of British Industry.  
Confederation of British Industry (CBI). (2012). Minor measures, major results. CBI Brief, March. London: Confederation of British 
Industry. 
Cowell, D., & Laurent, L. (2012). Bankers warn on Infrastructure lending drought. Reuters, 3 July. See 
[http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/07/03/banks-infrastructure-lending-idINL6E8I33QB20120703  ] 
Crocer, R.D. (2011). Pension Funds Investment in Infrastructure: Policy Actions. OECD publishing, OECD Working Papers on Finance, 
Insurance and Private Pensions, 13.  
FE Trustnet. (2012). 3i infrastructure factsheet. FE Trustnet report. See 
[http://www.trustnet.com/Factsheets/Factsheet.aspx?fundCode=T7F03&univ=T&pagetype=performance ] 
Financial Service Authorities (FSA) (2012). Background to Solvency II. London: FSA. See 
[http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/what/international/solvency/background ]   
FINCAD Derivatives News. (2012). Basel III could threaten key European infrastructure projects, say bankers.  Surrey, Canada: FINCAD 
derivatives news. See [http://derivative-news.fincad.com/derivatives-regulations/basel-iii-could-threaten-key-european-infrastructure-
projects-say-bankers-2529/ ] 
Flanders, S. (2012). Mr Osborne’s small plan for big infrastructure. BBC News 18 July. See [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18882172] 
Graham, P., & Menon, R. (2012). Government eyes pension fund billions for infrastructure. Reuters, 6 November. See 
[http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/11/06/uk-britain-pensions-infrastructure-govt-idUKLNE8A501Y20121106 ] 
431 Athena Panayiotou and Francesca Romana Medda /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  111 ( 2014 )  424 – 431 
Haward, E. (n.d.). Infrastructure Funds: The Why, What and How. New York: OTC conseil.  
HM Treasury (2012). Infrastructure Finance. See [ http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/infrastructure_finance.htm ] 
Hutchings, W. (2012). Schemes search for ways to make infrastructure pay. Financial News,12 November. See 
[http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2012-11-12/schemes-search-for-ways-to-make-infrastructure-pay ] 
Inderst, G. (2009). Pension Fund Investment in Infrastructure. OECD publishing, OECD Working Papers on Insurance and Private Pensions 
No.32.  
Infrastructure Investor (2012). Pension boss:'Money is there; structure isn’t'. PEI Infrastructure Investor, 7 November.  
Inspiratia (2010). Basel III and its impact on infra lending. London, UK: Inspiratia.  
Martin, G. (2010). The Long-Horizon Benefits of Traditional and New Real Assets in the Institutional Portfolio. Journal of Alternative 
Investments, 13,1,  6-29. 
Newell, G., Peng, H.W., & De Francesco, A. (2011). The performance of unlisted infrastructure in investment portfolios. Journal of Property 
Research, Special Issue: Infrastructure and Regeneration 28,1,  59-74. 
Peston, R. (2012). A UK Sovereign Wealth fund? BBC News, 5 December. See [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-20605586 ] 
Porter, K., & Krouse, S. (2012), PPF Chief: private equity ‘unsuitable’ for infra funding. Financial News , 7 November. See 
[http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2012-11-07/ppf-chief-criticises-pe-model-for-infrastructure] 
Probitas Partners (2009). What are Infrastructure Funds. London, UK: Probitas Partners.  
Probitas Partners (2007). Investing in Infrastructure Funds. London, UK: Probitas Partners.  
Russ, D., Thambiah, Y., & Foscari, N. (2010), Can Infrastructure Investing Enhance Portfolio Efficiency? White Paper. London, UK: Credit 
Suisse Asset Management (CSAM).  
World Bank (2011). Investing in infrastructure is still the best bet to spur growth, jobs, by 30 August. See 
[http://blogs.worldbank.org/latinamerica/node/552 by J.Schwatz] 
Threlfall, R. (2012). Infrastructure Investment: Is the UK government doing enough? BBC News, 20 July. See 
[http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18907389] 
 
 
 
 
 
